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It's important for me to explain that Israel isn't all tanks and soldiers running after 
small children. Israel isn't just the army. There are law-abiding citizens who are 
concerned about human rights in Israel. That's very important for me to clarify.1 
I think it’s our responsibility as Israeli Jews to tackle the propaganda tactics 
globally. If they are saying that anything that is pro-Palestinian is anti-Semitic, I 
think it’s on us to be there to say that doesn’t make sense.2 
We were born to the position of the coloniser […]. So, what’s our role? We have 
power, I didn’t choose to have it, so at least I can use it in a way that can actually 
break this situation.3 
These are the voices of Israeli–Jewish dissenters, who are actively challenging Israeli 
government policy, the Israeli state narrative and actions towards the Palestinians. The 
problems they focus on and the solutions they propose vary depending on ideological and 
political positioning. Some commit their time and energy in pursuit of an end to ‘the conflict’ 
and ‘peace’ between Israel and the Palestinians; others reveal the violations of Palestinian 
human rights at the hands of the Israeli authorities, in order to encourage an end of the Israeli 
military occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of the Gaza Strip; while others 
acknowledge their history as a colonising population, dedicating their efforts to supporting the 
struggle of the Palestinian people. This book tells the story of this broad spectrum of Israeli 
dissenters; their ideological and political beliefs, their actions on the ground, their relationships 
with the Palestinians, and their attempts to bring peace, equality and justice to the region. 
 
Without disregarding or silencing the voices and efforts of the Palestinians, it is worth looking 
at others who are also challenging the Israeli narrative and practices. In particular, it is worth 
looking at those who the Israeli authorities are dependent on: Israeli citizens, specifically 
Israeli–Jewish citizens. Given Israeli–Jews both implicitly and explicitly uphold the Israeli 
government and its policies, dissention among them is a key piece in creating change.  
 
The Israeli–Jewish dissenters are not a homogenous group, with a variety of organisations and 
individuals operating in Israel and Palestine. They can be divided into three components to help 
understand their trajectories.4 Groups in the ‘liberal Zionist component’ pursue political 
solutions to the ‘Israeli–Palestinian conflict’ and seek ways to achieve peace between what 
they view as two sides. They believe that the Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own 
and strive for the peace and security of the State of Israel. They emerged partly in opposition 
to the settler movement, Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), viewing the settlements as 
detrimental to the future and security of Israel, and give much of their attention to opposing the 
ideology and actions of the settlers.5 The settler movement seek to annex the West Bank, based 
on religious–nationalist beliefs of a Greater Land of Israel.6 In direct opposition, the liberal 
Zionist component understood the dangers of occupying another population and have proposed 
giving up the West Bank for the sake of peace. They became the largest voice of Israeli peace 
activists in the 1980s and 1990s, proposing a Palestinian State side-by-side with the Israeli 
State and continue to pursue a political peace process with the Palestinians. They include a 
number of public intellectuals, authors and former members of the Israeli Parliament, 
highlighting this component’s connection to powerful elites. Historically the liberal Zionist 
component has been criticised for being elitists, alienating those who are not middle-class, 
secular or educated Jews of Eastern European origin. They tend not to be too confrontational, 
aiming to speak to and mobilise the Israeli public and directly influence the government. 
 
The second component consider themselves ‘radical activists’, who consistently put the 
Palestinians at the centre of their concern, focusing on equality and justice, rather than peace. 
Their discourse has evolved from and in-line with the Palestinian narrative and discourse, with 
many of the activists acknowledging their position and history as colonisers. To differing 
levels, they align themselves with the position that Israel conducted an ethnic cleansing of the 
Palestinian people between 1947 and 1949,7 has colonised the West Bank since 1967,8 and has 
engaged in an ‘ongoing forced displacement’ of the Palestinians.9 They see themselves as co-
resisters or solidarity activists, promoting and supporting the resistance efforts of the 
Palestinian activists.  Thus, the Israeli activists and the Palestinian activists are acting alongside 
each other, influencing the ways in which they both perceive and respond to the prevailing 
realities There has not been a consistent political agenda among the radical groups, which 
include anarchists, anti-Zionists, who are against the establishment of a Jewish homeland in 
historic Palestine, those calling for a binational state, some calling for a two-state solution, and 
those who do not propose a political solution. Their tactics are the most confrontational and 
come with the risk of injury or arrest. While the insistence on equality or access to human rights 
is not ‘radical’ per se, given they are merely reflecting international norms and agreements, the 
activists are ‘radical’ in the sense that they are on the extreme margins of Israeli society, 
supporting and promoting positions that are considered unacceptable, taboo and even illegal 
within Israel.  
 
The third component is made up of the human rights organisations. ‘Human rights’ in this 
context refers to the everyday entitlements of Palestinians living under Israeli military 
occupation, which are being violated by the actions of Israel. These include, but are not limited 
to, freedom of movement, access to food and water, the right to education, and individual and 
collective security. ‘Human rights’ can also refer to the right to self-determination and the right 
to liberation, depending on the particular organisation. As human rights organisations they aim 
to hold the Israeli government accountable for their actions towards the Palestinians and seek 
to ensure that the Israeli public are aware of what is being done in their name. They employ 
Palestinians to document their daily lives and disseminate this both within Israel and abroad. 
They are less concerned with recognising or compensating historical injustices and do not tend 
to promote a political solution, but focus on the realities on the ground. While some tactics 
overlap with the radical groups, the efforts of the human rights organisations to speak to the 
Israeli public, government, and the international community, places them in a different 
component.  
 
Providing an overarching title to this broad spectrum of Israeli dissenters is complex. Using 
the term ‘Israeli peace movement’ is no longer accurate. Firstly, since the outbreak of the 
Palestinian Intifada in 2000,10 many groups do not use the term ‘peace,’ having either rejected 
support for a peace process over action on the ground or focused on human rights violations 
rather than a political agreement. Secondly, the term ‘movement’ is also inaccurate. Professor 
Tamar Hermann explains that the term ‘Israeli peace movement’ is an ‘analytical construct 
rather than a concrete entity’, noting that the ‘movement’ was always comprised of various 
individual organisations and groups that held different underlying beliefs and ideas about the 
political situation. She gives justification for the use of the term ‘peace movement’ because the 
many groups saw themselves as one body that was opposed to the nationalist camp within Israel 
and that many outsiders also saw them as one movement.11 In the period since 2000 this sector 
of Israeli society has become even more fragmented and more significantly, the term ‘Israeli 
peace movement’ has become a euphemism for the liberal Zionist component and therefore 
does not encapsulate the full range of groups operating. 
 
Figure 1.1: List of main groups in each component operating since 2000. 
 
This book therefore refers to ‘Israeli anti-occupation activism’, with all groups seeking to end 
‘the Israeli occupation’ in some form. The liberal Zionists and human rights groups use the 
term ‘occupation’ to refer to the areas that Israel occupied following the war in 1967, with a 
focus on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For many of the radical component, ‘occupation’ refers 
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to 1948 when the State of Israel was founded, arguing that all of historic Palestine is ‘occupied’. 
Therefore, the term ‘anti-occupation activism’ is relevant to describe all the groups detailed in 
this book after the Al Aqsa Intifada, and the definition of the type of occupation will be given 
where relevant.  
 
While the groups within each of these components represent different perspectives, which has 
always made it difficult for them to present one cohesive voice, in the late 1980s they began to 
rally together to persuade the Israeli government into negotiations with the Palestinians on the 
basis of ‘two states for two peoples.’ A ‘peace movement’ did emerge able to mobilise 
hundreds of thousands of Israelis emerged to lobby the government to make a two-state 
solution through peace agreements with the Palestinians its goal.  
 
Despite the peace movement achieving their ultimate objective, with the Israelis and 
Palestinians entering negotiations in the early 1990s, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the failure of the Camp David II Summit in 2000 and the outbreak of 
the Intifada that followed,12 dealt a severe blow to the Israeli peace movement, which is argued 
to have been in decline ever since.13 As explained in the newsletter of the Israeli Council for 
Israeli–Palestinian Peace, The Other Israel,14 
 
The peace-minded ordinary people, who for nearly three decades could be relied 
on to come out in their hundreds and thousands once or twice a year (and sometimes 
more frequently when the situation clearly demanded it) have disappeared from the 
streets since that fatal time in 2000.15 
 
Exhaustion and disillusionment, alongside an inability for the peace movement to form an 
agenda in response to the outbreak of the violent Intifada, marked the decline of the Israeli 
peace movement, as ‘many of the most prominent peace activists, silent and disillusioned, 
retired to the seclusion of their homes’.16 Given the importance of Israeli dissenters in 
challenging and putting pressure on their own government, this certainly presents a bleak 
picture. Yet, this is by no means the whole story.  
 
While Israeli anti-occupation activism has been in decline since its peak years in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, it would be a mistake to suggest that the efforts have become paralysed, 
without any significant activities or influence in the period since the Intifada in 2000. It has, 
actually, only been the more moderate, liberal Zionist component of Israeli anti-occupation 
activism that has experienced this decline. Many of the more radical groups and groups dealing 
with issues of human rights have continued to mobilise, with new groups emerging. The 
paralysis of the liberal Zionist component has created a ‘clearer and louder message of dissent’ 
among an array of Israeli anti-occupation organisations, networks and individuals.17 They are 
experiencing and developing new ways to understand the situation, developing new 
relationships with Palestinian activists, supporting their struggle, and creating stronger ties with 
the international community to encourage them to put pressure on Israel. Significantly, they are 
yielding some influence.  
 
Despite being small and on the margins of Israeli society, the radical groups have a precedent 
of yielding influence. Veteran activist and writer, Reuven Kaminer, has shown that historically 
the radical groups have been the agenda setters. While Peace Now, the largest of the liberal 
Zionist groups, was able to mobilise mass demonstrations, such as 50,000 to 80,000 people in 
January 1988 against the government’s response to the first Intifada,18 it was the pressure of 
the ‘small wheel of the bicycle’– the radical component – that pushed the ‘big wheel’ – the 
liberal Zionist component – to take certain positions and mobilise sooner than they would have 
otherwise.19 Ideas that originated in the radical groups, such as recognition that the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) was the true representative of the Palestinian people, eventually 
diffused into the liberal Zionist groups and later government policy. In the period beginning 
with the Al Aqsa Intifada, the ‘big wheel; little wheel’ dynamic no longer holds true and a new 
trajectory in Israeli anti-occupation activism can be identified. While, the ‘big wheel’ did slow 
down, this book shows that the ‘small wheel’, the radical component, along with the human 
rights component, continued to mobilise and develop new ideas.  
 
This transformation in Israeli anti-occupation activism will be approached through a framework 
based in social movement theory. The conceptual tools that constitute social movement theory 
provide a clear and logical way of analysing different aspects of contentious activity. Although 
peace activism since the Al Aqsa Intifada maybe too fragmented to constitute a social 
movement, the tools still have explanatory power even in relation to activism falling short of a 
sustained large-scale movement.  
 
There are a large variety of concepts with potential explanatory power that form social 
movement theory and this book will extract, refine and build upon those elements which are 
most relevant and useful in understanding the case of the Israeli anti-occupation activism. The 
theoretical perspective will draw particularly on the work of Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly and 
Doug McAdam.20 Tarrow  has succeeded in synthesising the various analytical tools developed 
in social movement theory.21 He outlines ‘fours powers of movement’: collective action 
frames, ‘how social movements construct meaning for action’;22 tactical repertoires, ‘the ways 
in which people act together in pursuit of shared interests’;23 mobilisation structures, ‘the 
fundamental infrastructures that support and condition citizen mobilisation’;24 and political 
opportunity structures, ‘factors of the external environment in which a social movement 
operates that facilitate or constrain activities’.25 These four powers of movement will frame 
each chapter in turn.  
 
While some scholars have applied aspects of social movement theory to their studies of Israeli 
anti-occupation activism,26 there is a general emphasis on the external factors that affect a social 
movement, such as the nature of the government, public opinion and perceptions on the peace 
process. A focus on these external factors has led scholars to conclude that the marginality of 
Israeli anti-occupation activism and their inability to influence policy change, confirm their 
political irrelevancy.27 However, a heavy focus on the external factors that affect Israeli anti-
occupation activism and contextualising it within the Oslo peace process,28 leaves little 
attention to the internal features of Israeli anti-occupation activism, thus overlooking those 
groups formulating different ideas and the influence these groups are having beyond the policy 
arena.  
 
There is therefore a need to give greater attention to the internal characteristics of a social 
movement in order to understand the internal dynamics and give weight to agency in social 
movement activities. This will enable a clear picture of transformations within the movement. 
As one Israeli activist explained in talking about the organisation she is involved in, 
 
The way in which we act in New Profile […] it cannot be affected by external, 
political developments, events and so on. Different paths that we decided to take 
were not the result of wars, Intifadas, Palestinian politics or anything of the sort. It 
was internal.29 
 
It was through this focus on the internal characteristics of Israeli anti-occupation activism, that 
the three distinct components were distinguished. Such typologies have a strong precedent in 
the study of peace movements and it helps to show that groups with different internal 
characteristics, despite dealing with the same area of contention and operating in the same 
environment, can experience different trajectories.30  
 
This book adopts the qualitative methods that have been employed as the standard approach to 
studying these groups.31 Since the study of a social movement is in some respects the study of 
the narratives of those individuals and groups of individuals involved in the social movement, 
qualitative research methods allow for an appreciation of the individuals’ understandings and 
interactions. It helps to unearth nuances and subtleties that may have been overlooked by more 
structured data gathering and gives a voice to marginalised sectors of society. Some 
quantitative measurement of certain aspects of social movements, such as calculating the 
amount of funding received per annum or referring to public opinion polls, will help to compare 
and contrast particular elements of and dynamics within a social movement. However, it would 
be difficult to gain accurate quantitative data for other aspects, such as the number of events 
held, due to the informal and ad hoc nature of a social movement and its component parts. Such 
methods are only partially employed when researching social movements, with scholars 
favouring interviews, testimonials and participant observation. 
 
A list of all the peace organisations that have been active in Israel since 1967 was compiled.32 
This is based upon a list drawn up by Professor Tamar Hermann and added to from useful 
internet resources, in particular ‘Insight on Conflict’ and ‘Just Vision’, and prior knowledge of 
certain groups.33 Throughout this book I provide the English name of the organisations where 
possible, so as to make accessible to readers. For cases where there is not an English name and 
the Hebrew name is used in English media, the Hebrew name is given in transliteration, 
followed by the English translation in brackets, or the English tag-line of the organisations 
follows the Hebrew name. This is to make it possible for those interested to further research 
the organisations. I gathered information on these groups mainly through interviews with 
activists in Israel, as well as some participant observation at different events and my own 
participation in tours and demonstrations. This began while I was living in Jerusalem from 
September 2009 to July 2010, followed by the main research trip from January 2013 to July 
2013, with some follow up during a research trip sponsored by the International Centre on 
Nonviolent Conflict in December from 2017 to January 2018.  
 
The network of Israeli peace activists is small and most people know or know of each other, 
which enabled a large number of interviews with activists across the spectrum of groups to be 
conducted. Over fifty interviews were conducted across these trips with individual activists, 
both core and periphery, across the spectrum of groups, organisation leaders, intellectuals, 
former Members of the Israeli Parliament and journalists. Some of the activists wanted their 
names to be used, with public engagement seen as part of the activism. However, for the sake 
of ethical considerations and to avoid personalising political opinions, anonymity will be held 
throughout for the interviews I conducted. Potential interviewees were contacted in Hebrew 
and English, to enable non-English speakers to respond. The interviews were offered to be 
conducted in Hebrew yet, all respondents chose English. This perhaps reflects their desire to 
reach out to the international community, as part of their activism. Given the complexities in 
the use of language, using English terms will only tell some of the story. Articles, blogs and 
chants in Hebrew were consulted to overcome this gap, with my own translations provided. 
However, translations will also leave behind some of the original meanings intended by certain 
words. Given the Israelis often speak in English to the Palestinians and engage in international 
activities to promote their work, the use of English terms and translations will still reflect how 
the activists frame themselves and their efforts. 
 
There is some likelihood that those who chose to be interviewed were the ones who were 
experienced and confident in speaking to a foreign researcher and therefore others will have 
been excluded, particularly those who are less prominent in certain groups or those with no 
access to email or spare time to participate. This is reflective of the elitist image attributed 
particularly to the liberal Zionist component, where those who front each group have a 
particular background. However, many of the newer groups that have emerged, particularly 
those made up of younger people and/or feminist organisations have made attempts to broaden 
their demographics and the movement is becoming more diverse. Attempts were therefore 
made to reach out to the more marginalised activists, such as, religious activists, radical 
feminists and Jews of Middle Eastern or North African descent. I succeeded in speaking to a 
range of Israeli–Jewish activists, of different ages, genders, ethnic origins, religiosity and levels 
of engagement, thus providing a broad array of voices among Israeli anti-occupation activists. 
Despite this, it should still be noted that some activists simply do not have the extra time or 
energy to meet with a researcher, because of commitments to their jobs and families, 
particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds involved in anti-occupation 
activism, who would have therefore been consulted less than those with disposable time. 
 During the periods of fieldwork, I attended a range of events and activities of the different 
groups. I attended three tours, with Emek Shaveh: Archaeology in the Shadow of Conflict in 
the City of David and village of Silwan, Ir Amim (City of Peoples) through East Jerusalem and 
Jerusalem Peace Makers in Hebron. I went to demonstrations held by Women in Black and 
Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit). I attended solidarity actions with Combatants for Peace, 
Solidarity Shiekh Jarrah and Ta’ayush: Arab–Jewish Partnership and accompanied Machsom 
(Checkpoint) Watch. I went to discussion forums held by The Coalition of Women for Peace, 
Combatants for Peace and We Do Not Obey. In 2018 I also attended demonstrations in the 
Palestinian village of Bil’in and further actions with Ta’ayush: Arab–Jewish Partnership. 
 
In addition to these interviews, I collected further information on the groups from their 
publications, websites, minutes of meetings, petitions, event advertisements and e-mails sent 
to mailing lists. Articles written by intellectuals and journalists, and lectures given, added to 
this. There are also two useful collections on Israeli anti-occupation activism that were 
consulted, particularly for groups that were founded before 2000: ‘the Israeli–left archive’, 
which has collated information on some of the main organisations from the sixties, seventies 
and eighties, including primary documents; and The Other Israel, a magazine which has 
detailed the activities across the spectrum of groups between 1983 to present day and is 
available online. Newspaper articles, both in print and on the internet, particularly from the 
newspaper Haaretz and online media platforms, such as +972mag, Bitterlemons, Occupation 
Magazine and other editorials were also useful. In some instances, primary sources, such as 
testimonies, were extracted from these, adding to the rich set of primary information for this 
study.  
 
For any researcher, objectivity and neutrality can never be achieved, due to the positionality 
from which we approach our research, determined by our social, cultural and subject positions. 
Thus, the questions we ask, the relationships we develop with our subjects, our access to 
information and whether we will be listened to is affected by who we are.34 As a British–Jew, 
who grew up in a progressive Zionist Jewish Youth Organisation, I held strong to the liberal 
Zionist perspective and was unaware of the actual predicament of the Palestinians. When I 
moved to Jerusalem in 2009 to work for the Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and 
Information, my eyes were opened both to the struggle of the Palestinians and to the array of 
radical anti-occupation voices coming from Israeli–Jews. I began to involve myself in Israeli 
groups that were actively challenging aspects of Israeli policies and standing alongside the 
Palestinians. My sympathies turned to supporting the Palestinian struggle, but my schooling 
stems from the Israeli and Jewish anti-occupation discourse. Thus, the language I use, the 
questions I asked and the access I obtained reflects the Israeli–Jewish narrative. Efforts have 
been made to take this bias into account, by expanding the language used to describe certain 
events and to look critically at the Israeli–Jewish narrative.  
 
Language is particularly complicated when discussing the situation in Israel and Palestine. 
Words used to describe events, policies and practices are laden with ideological perspectives. 
For example, referring to the ‘Israeli–Palestinian conflict’, the ‘Israeli military occupation’ or 
‘Israeli settler-colonialism’ will reflect different discourses around the causes and solutions of 
what has happened and what is happening today in Israel and Palestine. Given these 
complexities, this book will try to explain the use of terms employed and in particular highlight 
the terms that are employed by the activists themselves. In doing so, it will show how Israeli 
dissenters have transformed their perspectives, as well as clear disparities among different 
groups within this sector of Israeli society. Furthermore, this will demonstrate how their 
narratives and discourse reflect or diverge from the Israeli mainstream discourse, Palestinian 
perspectives and the position of the international community. It is the purpose of the remainder 
of this book to tell the story of these Israeli–Jewish dissenters through their messaging, tactics, 
organisational forms and response to the external environment. It will begin with the messages 
and ideas of the Israeli anti-occupation activists 
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